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Abstract. Legal positivists maintain that the legality of a rule is fundamentally determined by 
social facts. Yet for much of legal history, ordinary officials used legal terminology in ways that 
seem inconsistent with positivism. Judges regularly cited, analyzed, and predicated their 
decisions on the ‘laws of justice’ which they claimed had universal legal import. This practice, 
though well-documented by historians, has received surprisingly little philosophical attention; I 
argue that it invites explanation from positivists. After taxonomizing the positivist’s explanatory 
options, I suggest that the most viable option appeals to conceptual change: classical Romans, 
early modern Europeans, founding-era Americans were not using ‘law’ (or ‘lex’ or ‘jus’) to refer 
to the subject matter of contemporary legal philosophy. But the strategy is costly. It renders 
positivism’s truth surprisingly parochial. And it supplies new reasons for doubting positivist 
accounts of contemporary practices, including the treatment of moral principles in modern 
adjudication. 
 
Introduction 
It is not the job of legal philosophy to bring unity to all recorded uses of ‘law.’ Nevertheless, a 
good philosophical account of law should be diachronically plausible. It should be able to make 
explanatory sense of the history of the concept of juridical law.1 This modest point does not rely 
on the assumption that when we talk about law today, we share an identical concept with our 
distant linguistic forbearers. It assumes only that we have reason to expect some connection 
between the subject matter of legal philosophy and the use of legal terminology across history.  
One way to motivate this connection is by appeal to norms of semantic deference.2 Our 
dispositions to defer to others in our linguistic community play a role in fixing the content of 
 
 
 
1 I echo an observation of Jennings’ that a philosophical account of a concept can be evaluated based on 
its fit and explanatory power in relation to the concept’s history; see Raymond E Jennings, The 
Genealogy of Disjunction (Oxford University Press, 1995). On the use of conceptual genealogy in 
analytic philosophy generally, see e.g., Matthieu Queloz, The Practical Origins of Ideas: Genealogy as 
Conceptual Reverse-Engineering (Oxford University Press, 2021). 
2 On semantic deference, see e.g., Tyler Burge, “Intellectual Norms and the Foundations of Mind” (1986) 
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many of our concepts. We defer to natural scientists on the nature of the referent of ‘water.’ 
Likewise, we defer to jurists concerning the content of the law. Moreover, our semantic 
deference practices in the legal case arguably extend into the past, to the origins of legal systems. 
For example, in the United States, constitutional originalists regard the meaning of legal 
terminology—and some, the very idea of law itself—as fixed at the founding of the American 
legal order. The founders in turn borrowed liberally from the English legal tradition, and English 
jurists had deference dispositions of their own. Given such chains of semantic deference, 
however varied and potentially unstable, it would be surprising to discover that past legal usage 
has played no role in determining the content of our prevailing legal concept.3 
This paper explores the relationship between the historical concept of law as reflected in 
the use of legal terminology by ordinary legal officials, and legal positivism, widely credited as 
being the leading theory of law in contemporary analytic jurisprudence. Positivists maintain that 
social facts—facts concerning what people have said, believed, done, or intended to do—
fundamentally determine whether a rule or norm counts as law. On Hart’s influential 
formulation, what makes a rule a rule of law is either the prevalence in the jurisdiction of certain 
attitudes of obedience towards the rule or the fact that the rule can be derived from more 
fundamental legal rules that are generally obeyed, for example, rules of adjudication or law-
making.4 A sampling of the historical record serves to introduce a general puzzle that positivists 
have overlooked but ought to address. For much of legal history, ordinary officials classified 
moral principles as law on seemingly a priori grounds, a practice that at least on its surface seems 
inconsistent with positivism. In addition to relying on principles of fairness, impartiality, and 
justice in adjudication,5 judges regularly attributed a species of universal legality to such 
principles. These are not just passing references to the ‘laws of justice,’ as a judge might refer to 
the ‘laws of chess’ in a case that happens to implicate some extra-legal normative structure. 
Rather, ‘moral laws’ have been used in ways that bear all the markings of juridical law: they 
 
 
 
83 J. of Phil. 697; Paul Horwich, Reflections on Meaning (Oxford University Press, 2005) at 52; Laura 
Schroeter & Francois Schroeter, “Semantic Deference versus Semantic Coordination” (2016) 53 
American Phil. Q. 193.  
3 As Burge puts it, ‘[w]e may imagine a vast, ragged network of [semantic] interdependence, established 
by patterns of deference which lead back to people who would elicit the assent of others’; supra note 2 at 
702. 
4 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law, 3rd ed by Leslie Green & Joseph Raz (Clarendon Press, 2012). 
5 The fact that modern judges rely on moral principles in adjudication is the locus of a familiar 
disagreement between Ronald Dworkin and legal positivists. See Ronald Dworkin, “The Model of Rules” 
(1967) 35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 14; “Social Rules and Legal Theory” (1972) 81 Yale L. J. 855; “Hard Cases” 
(1975) 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1057. The relevance of genealogical considerations to this disagreement has been 
overlooked; see §2. 
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have been cited, analyzed, and made the basis for prominent holdings.6 And the more deeply we 
examine the record—from 19th century Anglo-American law to classical Roman law—the more 
pervasive the practice appears.  
§1 summarizes the historical evidence. This initial section moves quickly relative to its 
scope, since the paper’s primary focus is on the record’s philosophical significance, and not on 
compiling a comprehensive history of the ‘laws of justice.’ The targeted examination of the 
historical record is aimed at motivating both an explanatory puzzle and a need to examine the 
record more closely. §2 observes that the historically ordinary—that is, non-philosophical and 
relatively mainstream—conception of moral principles as ‘natural laws’ receives limited 
attention within the Hart-Dworkin debate, even though central questions in this debate are not 
unrelated to historical practice. Next, I argue that the usage facts invite explanation from the 
positivist and proceed to taxonomize the available explanatory strategies. §3 considers an initial 
set of strategies on behalf of the positivist; these proceed on the assumption that we share a 
common concept of law with the past. The CONVENTIONALIST appeals to positivist criteria for 
legality to explain why jurists through the ages have classified moral principles as law: a 
jurisdiction-specific legal custom licensed the classifications. The FICTIONALIST takes the 
judgments to be insincere, a useful fiction that officials have knowingly indulged in. The ERROR-
THEORIST pegs the judgments to a pervasive mistake or confusion. I argue that conventionalism 
(§3.1) and fictionalism (§3.2) are not supported by the historical evidence; both interpretations 
distort the claims and behavior of jurists. Meanwhile, a positivist error-theory (§3.3) lacks a 
plausible theory of error. The problem is that the affirmative claims that make up positivism 
cannot explain why experts immersed in legal practice would have had basic intuitions about law 
that are not just mistaken but, on the assumption of positivism, seem implausibly arbitrary.7 
Since the above strategies for reconciling historical usage with positivism seem week, §4 
considers an alternative (and more promising) approach that involves denying the common 
concept assumption. The REFERENCE-SHIFTER maintains that the meaning of legal terminology 
 
 
 
6 Shapiro reminds us that ‘many things that English speakers refer to as “law” are not law in the relevant 
sense’, for example ‘Boyle’s law’ and the ‘law of Cosines’; see Scott J Shapiro, Legality (Harvard 
University Press, 2011) at 6. I focus on cases where the contextual evidence strongly indicates that 
references to ‘moral law’ or the ‘law of justice’ are intended in the juridical sense—as the law of the land 
to be applied in cases. We can distinguish legally relevant uses of ‘law’ by closely examining what jurists 
say and do, while drawing on relatively uncontested assumptions about the theoretical role of the juridical 
concept. The positivist cannot declare by fiat that a judge’s use of ‘law’ to refer to moral principles is 
extra-legal, no more than the anti-positivist can take for granted that any reference to ‘moral law’ is 
relevant to legal philosophy. For further discussion, see §1. 
7 This point is compatible with past jurists being mistaken. The target isn’t error theories in general, but 
an error theory that is specifically based on positivism. For further discussion, see §3.3. 
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has shifted over time, tracking the evolving dispositions of legal language users. While this 
approach has several virtues, it is not without cost. For one, it renders the truth of positivism 
surprisingly parochial in a way that calls into question standard accounts of the philosophical 
dialectic. On the standard picture, philosophers offering a metaphysics of juridical ‘law,’ from 
Aristotle and Aquinas to their contemporary counterparts, have been analyzing a shared subject; 
reference-shift seems incompatible with this picture. Moreover, the positivist needs an account of 
conceptual change—how a term with a putatively moral meaning ended up referring to a subject 
amenable to positivistic analysis.8 And certain ways of developing this meta-semantic account, I 
argue, reveal new reasons for doubting positivist interpretations of contemporary practices, such 
as a modern judge’s reliance on moral considerations in adjudication. 
 
§1 Genealogical jurisprudence 
The history of the concept of law and legal usage has yet to be written, and a comprehensive 
account of this history lies well beyond the scope of this paper. In this section, I limit myself to 
highlighting one aspect of the historical record to explore its philosophical significance—
namely, the basis for thinking that jurists standardly conceived of moral principles as a form of 
universal law in prior legal systems. I offer a sampling of juridical commentary on the ‘law of 
justice’ and accounts of the practice furnished by historians. Invariably, the following 
observations are informed by assumptions about the legal concept’s theoretical role—for 
example, that law is used to decide cases, laws are cited, laws are situated within a larger body of 
legal rules, and so on. But the assumptions are dialectically neutral, and any inferences drawn on 
their basis provisional. In other words, no philosophical questions of ideal interpretation and 
explanation are raised or settled in this initial section.   
1.1 Classical Roman law 
Marcus: If then in the majority of nations, many pernicious and mischievous 
enactments are made, as far removed from the law of justice we have defined 
 
 
 
8 It is sometimes suggested that the central project of analytic jurisprudence is best understood in terms of 
real definition or grounding, rather than conceptual analysis. See e.g., Gideon Rosen, “Metaphysical 
Dependence and Reduction” in Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology (Oxford University 
Press, 2010) 109 at 201; Andrei Marmor, “Farewell to Conceptual Analysis (in Jurisprudence)” in W 
Waluchow & S Sciaraffa, eds, Philosophical Foundations of the Nature of Law (Oxford University Press, 
2013). The ground-theoretic framing of the issues is perfectly compatible with the argument of this paper. 
Any account of the grounds of law needs to make preliminary use of the concept of law to fix the target of 
metaphysical explanation. Hence, the philosophy of law can hardly ignore metasemantic questions, even 
if it remains true that metasemantic questions (or questions of conceptual analysis, conceptual genealogy, 
and so on) do not exhaust the philosophical enterprise.  
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as the mutual engagements of robbers, are we bound to call them laws? … 
Quintus: I quite agree with you, and think that no law but that of justice should either be 
proclaimed as a law or enforced as a law. 
Marcus: Then you regard as nullable and voidable the laws of Titius and Apuleius, 
because they are unjust. 
Quintus: You may say the same of the laws of Livius. 
  
- De Legibus I, Marcus Tullius Cicero 
 
The conventional view among historians concerning the legal traditions of ancient Rome, from 
the period roughly beginning in the third century BC and ending with the fall of the empire in the 
fifth century AD, is that magistrates and jurisconsults regularly invoked principles of fairness 
and equity which they deemed universally applicable ‘natural laws.’9 Scholars rely on the 
evidence of a collection of famous texts, the Corpus Juris Civilis, commissioned by the Emperor 
Justinian in the first half of the sixth century.10 One of these texts, Justinian’s Institutes, was 
intended as an introductory text for new law students in the sixth century, and begins by defining 
‘jurisprudence’ as ‘the science of the just and the unjust.’11 Justice is in turn defined in terms of 
three basic principles: ‘[t]o live honestly, to hurt no one, and to give everyone his due.’12 What 
follows is an ‘exposition of the law of the Roman people’ introduced thusly: 
The study of law is divided into two branches; that of public and that of private law. 
Public law is that which regards the government of the Roman Empire; private law, that 
which concerns the individuals. We are now to treat of the latter, which is composed of 
three elements, and consists of precepts belonging to natural law, to the law of nations 
and to the civil law.13   
The ‘law of nature’ is in turn characterized in terms of ‘rules prescribed by natural reason’ 
(naturalis ratio).14 The jurist Ulpian writes in the Digest, the main volume of the Corpus Juris 
 
 
 
9 See e.g., Frederick Pollock, “The History of the Law of Nature: A Preliminary Study” (1901) 1 Colum. 
L. Rev. 13-14; Roscoe Pound, “The Maxims of Equity I” (1921) 34 Harvard L. Rev. 809; John R Kroger, 
“The Philosophical Foundations of Roman Law: Aristotle, the Stoics, and Roman Theories of Natural 
Law” (2004) Wisconsin L. Rev. 905; Paul A Vander Waerdt, “Philosophical Influence on Roman 
Jurisprudence? The Case of Stoicism and Natural Law” in Philosophie, Wissenschaften, Technik 
Philosophie (Systematische Themen; Indirekte Überlieferungen; Allgemeines; Nachträge, 1994). 
10 See e.g., William L Burdick, Principles of Roman Law and their Relation to Modern Law, 3rd ed, 
(Lawbook exchange, 2004) at 3-4. 
11 J. Inst. 1.1.1., translated by T.C. Sandars (1883). 
12 Ibid at 1.1.3. 
13 Ibid at 1.1.4 [emphasis added]. 
14 Ibid at 1.2.1. 
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Civilis consisting of juristic commentary on Roman law, ‘[a] law student at the outset of his 
studies ought first to know the derivation of the word jus. Its derivation is from justitia. For, in 
terms of Celsus’ elegant definition, the law is the art of goodness and fairness.’15 Ulpian 
proceeds to give an account of Roman ‘private law’ in terms of a tripartite division, as ‘derived 
from principles of jus naturale [natural law], jus gentium [law of nations], or jus civile [civil 
law].’16 Meanwhile, the ‘civil law’ which is ‘derived from statutes, plebiscites, decrees,…’ is in 
turn described as:  
that which neither wholly diverges from the jus naturale and jus gentium nor follows the 
same in every particular. And so whenever to the common law we add anything or take 
anything away from it, we make a law special to ourselves, that is, jus civile, civil law. 1. 
This law of ours, therefore, exists either in written or unwritten form; as the Greeks put it, 
‘of laws some are written, others unwritten.’17 
  
The degree to which Justinian’s texts remained faithful to the actual practice of Roman law is 
controversial.18 But the generally accepted position seems to be that Rome’s commitment to the 
laws of justice was not merely theoretical.19 Honoré provides a wide range of examples from the 
Digest of jurists invoking naturalis obligio, naturalis ratio, and naturalis aequitas as a basis for 
deciding concrete questions of law.20 Similarly, Pomeroy notes that magistrates empowered to 
 
 
 
15 Dig. 1.1.1, pr (Ulpian, Ad Edictum 18) translated by C Monro (1904).  
16 Ibid at 1.1.2. 
17 Ibid at 1.6.1, pr. 
18 See Vander Waerdt, supra note 9 at 4879.  
19 Ibid at 4851-53. See also Pound, supra note 9 at 813-14. Drawing on the work of Paul Jörs, Römische 
Rechtswissenschaft zur Zeit der Republik, Pound describes Rome’s equitable maxims in the following 
terms: 
 “From recognition that certain regulae, to be discovered and established by juristic research, lay 
at the foundation of application of law, it was a short step to the wider thought that a lex also need 
not be regarded as a mere aggregate of precepts but that these precepts themselves are but forms 
or derivatives of ideas of right which should be formulated theoretically as regulae.” This leads to 
the philosophical view of ratio ijuris and of all legal rules, whether statutory or traditional or 
doctrinal, as but expressions of or attempts to formulate principles of natural law… Roman legal 
science was never purely theoretical. Application to concrete causes was the end of theory and the 
end was kept constantly in view.  
20 Tony Honoré, “Ulpian, Natural Law, and Stoic Influence” (2010) 78 Tijdschrift voor 
Rechtsgeschiedenis 199 at 203-204 [citations omitted]: 
‘“Nature” not merely rules out an obligation to perform what is by nature impossible, but gives 
reasons for or against rules and institutions. It provides the right of self-defence. It endorses 
certain modes of acquiring property. Blood relationship is natural. Along with decency, nature 
condemns incest. It eschews speculation about another’s misfortune. It supports the repayment of 
payments made that were not in fact owed. It allows us consciously to improve the position of 
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apply Roman law regularly invoked unwritten laws of justice, and his observations are worth 
quoting in full:  
In their work of improving the primitive jus civile, the [Roman] magistrates who issued 
edicts and the jurisconsults who furnished authoritative opinions … obtained their 
material from two sources: namely: At first, from what they term the jus gentium, the law 
of nations, meaning thereby those rules of law which they found existing alike in the 
legal systems of all the peoples with which Rome came into contact, and which they 
conceived to have a certain universal sanction…; and at a later day, from the Stoic theory 
of morality, which they called lex naturae, the law of nature. The doctrines of this jus 
gentium and of this lex naturae were often identical…. The particular rules of the Roman 
jurisprudence derived from morality called the law of nature were termed “aequitas,” 
from aequum, because they were supposed to be impartial in their operation, applying to 
all persons alike. The lex naturae were assumed to be the governing force of the world, 
and were regarded by the majistrates and jurists as having an absolute authority. They 
felt themselves, therefore, under an imperative obligation to bring the jurisprudence into 
harmony with this all-pervading morality, and to allow such actions and make such 
decisions that no moral rule should be violated. … [T]hus a body of moral principles was 
introduced into the Roman law, which constituted equity. This resulting equity was not a 
separate department; it penetrated the entire jurisprudence, displacing what of the 
ancient system was arbitrary and unjust, and bringing the whole into an accordance with 
the prevailing notions of morality.21  
Vander Waerdt writes that ‘the hypothesis of extensive and substantive Stoic [ethical] influence 
on Roman jurisprudence is widely regarded as historical fact.’22 And while Vander Waerdt 
dissents from the orthodox view that the principles of jus naturale were derived specifically from 
stoic moral theory, he too concludes that Roman jurists habitually appealed to equitable 
principles ‘to interpret or to correct received law’ and that these ‘legal doctrines’ are the key to 
understanding ‘the moral basis of Roman jurisprudence.’23 
Notably, the legality of the ‘laws of justice’ is not explained in terms of obedience to 
customs or conventions. Rather, on Pomeroy’s account—who, it should be emphasized, does not 
have an anti-positivist axe to grind—the legality of equitable principles was presented by jurists 
as following self-evidently from the fact that the principles conform to requirements of reason 
 
 
 
others, but not to make it worse. It imposes losses on those who profit from the thing in question. 
It provides that no one should be enriched by a wrong to another. Some ways of behaving are 
naturally wrong. The law of nature is always equitable and good.  
21 John Norton Pomeroy, A Treatise on Equity Jurisprudence (Bancroft-Whitney, 1907) at §8 [emphasis 
added]. 
22 Vander Waerdt, supra note 9 at 4853. 
23 Ibid at 4895. 
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and justice.24 Moreover, the legality of such principles was expressly distinguished from the 
legality of rules derived from the customs of nations, even when moral and customary 
requirements seemed to coincide.25 Finally, the jurisconsults conceived of their task as law 
discovery.26 Similar observations have been made by historians concerning the legal culture of 
ancient Greece.27  
1.2 Early modern civilian and common law 
The fact that Roman law influenced the development of civil law on the European continent has 
been widely documented, but the extent to which moral considerations drove ordinary legal 
practice under the guise of ‘jus naturale’ has received far less attention.28 A recent study by 
Richard Helmholz offers a broad-ranging examination of European decisiones (accounts of 
arguments and decisions in courts) and consilia (legal opinions written by jurists) from 1500 to 
1800.29  Helmholz observes that ‘[t]he law of nature, taken up and used as a source of legal 
argument and decision, appeared within virtually every collection of decisions and consilia 
consulted. … References to the law of nature were… clear and repeated in the reports—enough 
to show that it was not simply abstract jurisprudential theory.’30 
 
 
 
24 See also Pound, supra note 9 at 813-14. 
25 Pomeroy, supra note 21 at §8. 
26 Ibid. See also Peter G Stein, “Roman Law, Common law, and Civil Law” (1991) 66 Tul. L. Rev. 1591 
at 1591-2, noting that Roman law “was perceived as essentially law discovered through debates among 
experts over particular sets of facts.” 
27 See, e.g., John W Salmond, “Law of Nature” (1895) 11 L. Q. Rev. 121 at 124; Maurice Le Bel, 
“Natural Law in the Greek Period” (1949) 2 Nat. L. Inst. Proc. 3. Le Bel writes:  
‘natural law’ has today a definite Christian connotation; it has none, of course, in pagan Greece, 
where natural law is considered as a thing of human reason alone. … These precepts are 
immanent in human nature, they are part of our nature, they are the very expression of the 
universal notion of justice; they are implanted in us, we would not be what we are without them. 
Ibid at 9. Le Bel comments further: “I intentionally started with the non-philosophers in order to show 
that natural law is not a philosopher’s conception alone; it was talked about in conversation, it was 
brought on the stage, it was admitted in the writing of history.” Ibid at 17. Cf. Aristotle: ‘[T]he laws of 
natural justice… are universally valid above all human regulations and legally valid.’ Nicomachean 
Ethics, translated by WD Ross (Batoche Books, 2009) at V/ vii, 1134b, 25-1135a 15. 
28 See, e.g., Burdick, supra note 10 at 3-10; TJ Bochstrasser & Peter Schroder, Early Modern Natural 
Law Theories: Context and Strategies in the Early Enlightenment (Springer, 2003);  Pound, supra note 9 
at 820-24.  
29 Richard H Helmholz, Natural Law in Court: A History of Legal Theory in Practice (Harvard University 
Press, 2015). 
30 Ibid at 42 [emphasis added]. 
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One of Helmholz’s examples is a case involving unowned property belonging to the first 
possessor—the holding ‘was supported by a citation to the law of nature as well as a text from 
the digest.’31 In a Florentine case involving a criminal defendant’s right to due process, ‘a prior 
precedent’s apparent violation of the law of nature was given as the reason for not following 
it.’32 On Helmholz’s assessment of the caselaw, ‘[n]atural law was regularly cited in the law of 
civil and criminal procedure’ and ‘citations of both sources of law (natural and ‘positive’) made 
a stronger case.’33 Other legal domains in which jurists referred to considerations of fairness and 
equity under the rubric of natural law include family law,34 criminal law,35 commercial law,36 
and statutory interpretation.37 In one example, a church ordinance forbidding the grant of any 
benefice to descendants of a heretic was declared ‘odious’ and unenforceable for violating a 
principle of natural justice.38  
Helmholz observes that this early modern European conception of jus naturale was in 
core respects similar to classical Rome’s. Lawyers were taught that the principles of justice are 
(a) discovered through rational reflection, (b) exhibit a form of legality with universal 
application, and (c) can be legitimately relied on in court: 
Evidence found in the early European decisiones and works of praxis shows the 
relevance of the law of nature to what happened in courts. Lawyers put into practice what 
they had first learned as students. In giving advice and in arguing cases, they drew upon 
the experience with natural law they had acquired. It served various ends: to create 
presumptions to interpret statutes, to evaluate commercial transactions, to solve disputes 
within a family, and to restrain arbitrary exercises of power. … virtually always, it was 
cited together with precedents from the positive law or ius gentium… overlap between 
positive and natural law was actually a sign of the influence of the latter, not an 
indication of its lack of consequence…. Where no positive law to govern a particular 
subject could be found, recourse was to be had to the law of nature.39 
 
 
 
31 Ibid at 44. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid at 53.   
35 Ibid at 58. 
36 Ibid at 63. 
37 Ibid at 68. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid at 79-80. 
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The influence of Roman legal thought on the development of English common law has, 
likewise, been well-documented.40  Helmholz writes that: 
English common lawyers did not customarily use the terms “Law of Nature” or “Natural 
law” in so many words. Instead, they looked to what “reason” dictated… thereby 
applying the same general principles as did the civilians who expressly cited natural law. 
The words were different, but the substance was not.41 
He goes on to provide over sixty examples of influential English jurists writing favorably of the 
‘law of reason’ and the ‘laws of justice’ as a source of English law.42  Since this evidence has 
been effectively documented elsewhere, I limit myself to highlighting a few famous and 
illustrative cases of juridical commentary concerning the principles. 
In Day v. Savadge, chief justice Hobart observes ‘even an act of parliament, made against 
natural equity as to make a man judge in his own case, is void in itself; for jura naturae sunt 
immutabilia (the Laws of Nature are unchangeable), and they are leges legum (the laws of 
law).’43 While Hobart declined to read the act at issue in the case as being in conflict with the 
laws of natural equity, the pleadings seemed to have already conceded the conflict, rendering the 
natural equity argument legally significant.44 In City of London v. Wood, chief justice Holt 
reaffirmed the principle of impartiality that a person cannot be a judge in their own cause, while 
describing as ‘very reasonable and true’45 Edward Coke’s observations in the leading precedent 
for the principle Dr. Bonham’s Case:  ‘when an act of parliament is against common right and 
reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the common law will control it, and adjudge 
such act to be void.’46 In his work on the legal theories that prevailed during this period of 
 
 
 
40 See e.g., Stuart E Prall, “The Development of Equity in Tudor England” (1964) 8 Am. J. Legal Hist. 1 
at 18; Pound, supra note 9 at 827-36; Richard H Helmholz, “Natural Law and Human Rights in English 
Law: From Bracton to Blackstone” (2005) 3 Ave Maria L. Rev. 1. 
41 Helmholz, supra note 40 at 12. For example, Christopher St Germain, in Dialogus de fundamentis 
legum Anglie et de conscientia 1, describes the ‘law of reason’ as among the six ‘grounds of the law of 
England’ and distinguishable from customary law and religious law.  
42 Helmholz, supra note 40 at 5-11. 
43 Day v. Savadge, [1614] 80 Eng. Rep. 235 at 237.  
44 Ibid. ‘[T]hough in pleading it were confessed, that the custom of certificate of the customs of London is 
confirmed by Parliament, yet it made no change in this case, both because it is none of the customs 
intended, and because even an Act of Parliament, made against natural equity,… is void in it self.’ See 
also Charles M Gray, “Bonham’s Case Reviewed” (1972) 116 Proc. Am. Phil. Soc’y 35 at 51.  
45 City of London v. Wood, [1702] 88 Eng. Rep. 1592 at 1602.  
46 Dr. Bonham’s case, [1610] 77 Eng. Rep. 646 at 652. On Coke’s ambitious conception of the judge’s 
role, see DEC Yale, “Iudex in Propria Causa: An Historical Excursus” (1974) 33 Cambridge L.J. 80 at 92; 
Edward S Corwin, “Higher Law and Constitutional Law” in R Loss, ed, Corwin on the Constitution (De 
Gruyter, 2019) at 111. Corwin writes:  
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English history, Philip Hamburger observes that a broad range of jurists were committed to 
certain fundamental principles of justice being ‘natural laws’ and that ‘Holt argued that 
government—including even a representative institution such as Parliament—was subject to 
natural law.’47  
In Calvin’s case, Coke refers with exceptional directness to the ‘Lex aeterna, the moral 
law, called also the law of nature.’48 Coke’s observations concerning the character of these laws 
are worth highlighting: ‘the law of nature is immutable, and cannot be changed… the law of 
nature is part of the laws of England,’ and ‘the law of nature was before any judicial or 
municipal law in the world.’49 Coke cites Aristotle for the proposition that ‘natural right is that 
which has the same force among all mankind.’50 Important use was made of ‘moral law’ in 
Calvin’s case, which held that all persons born within English territory would enjoy the benefits 
of English law, allowing the Scottish-born plaintiff to bring a claim against the defendants for 
dispossessing him of his estate. In developing a precursor to birthright citizenship, Coke asserts 
that the law of justice was the determining factor in the case.51 In a detailed examination of the 
case and its context, Price writes that Coke’s theory was based on the ‘reciprocal nature of the 
relationship placed on subject and sovereign,’ such that ‘[i]n return for the subject’s loyalty, the 
sovereign owed “protection and government due by the law of nature”.’52 Price observes ‘[t]he 
critical result was that allegiance to the English sovereign, and for a time, acquisition of and 
rights associated with citizenship in the former American colonies, were considered not to be the 
subject of municipal or positive law-making.’53 
 The above cases involve influential English jurists invoking moral considerations as 
supra-constitutional constraints on the legislature while directly attributing legality to basic 
principles of impartiality and reciprocity. There is also considerable evidence of English courts 
from this period ostensibly referring to principles of fairness as a form of law, to be weighed 
 
 
 
One thing seems to be assured at the outset - Coke was not asserting simply a rule of statutory 
construction which owed its force to the assumed intention of Parliament as it would today, 
although the statute involved in Bonham’s Case was also construed from that point of view…. 
Coke was enforcing a rule of higher law deemed by him to be binding on Parliament and the 
ordinary courts alike. 
47 Philip A Hamburger, “Revolution and Judicial Review: Chief Justice Holt’s Opinion in City of London 
v. Wood” (1994) 94 Colum. L. Rev. 2091 at 2093, 2152.  
48 Calvin v. Smith, [1608] 77 E.R. 377 at 392.  
49 Ibid.  
50 Ibid.  
51 Ibid at 394. See also Polly J Price, “Natural Law and Birthright Citizenship in Calvin’s Case (1608)” 
(1997) 9 Yale J.L. & Human. 73 at 120. 
52 Price, supra note 51 at 121, citing Calvin’s case at 392.  
53 Ibid at 116.  
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together with other ‘positive’ laws, in ordinary cases at common law and equity; the examples 
are easily multiplied.54 
1.3 Pre-20th century American law 
Several historians have documented the influence of natural law ideas on early American 
jurisprudence.55 In a recent study, Stuart Banner writes that ‘[b]efore the late 19th century, 
natural law played an important role in the American legal system. Lawyers routinely used it in 
their arguments and judges often relied upon it in their opinions.’56 The popularity of the ‘laws of 
justice’ is reflected in an observation of Oliver Wendell Holmes’ from 1918 that ‘[t]he jurists 
who believe in natural law seem to me to be in that naïve state of mind that accepts what has 
been familiar and accepted.’57 As above, rather than reviewing the historical literature in detail, I 
restrict myself for reasons of space to a few illustrative examples of case law from this period. 
 
 
 
54 See, e.g., Cornfoot v. Fowke, [1840] 151 E.R. 450 at 458: ‘In the case of Hodson v. Williamson… Mr. 
Justice Yates lays it down as a general proposition, that “the concealment of material circumstances 
vitiates all contracts, upon the principles of natural law.” If this be true, can it be doubted that the false 
representation of a material circumstance also vitiates a contract?’; Millar v. Taylor, [1769] 98 E.R. 201, 
which held that the Statute of Anne did not extinguish common law rights giving publishers a perpetual 
copyright to their works; ibid at 229: ‘[T]his, I apprehend, was a necessary ground for the plaintiff to 
maintain; for, however peculiar the laws of this and every other country may be, with respect to territorial 
property, I will take upon me to say, that the law of England, with respect to all personal property, had its 
grand foundation in natural law’; ibid at 223: ‘It is certainly not agreeable to natural justice, that a stranger 
should reap the beneficial pecuniary produce of another man’s work. Jure naturæ æquum est, neminem 
cum alterius detrimento et injuria fieri locupletiorem’; Gurney v. Hardenberg, [1908] 127 E.R. 923, which 
held that a defendant’s property could be levied despite the defendant’s lack of presence in England; ibid 
at 924: ‘it is strange that such a practice should have so long prevailed in this court, since however it is 
established, it must prevail now, but it appears to me repugnant to the principles of law and the principles 
of justice. The same thing is law and justice in this court’; Wright v. Simpson, [1902] 31 E.R. 1272 at 
1275: ‘[T]he equitable jurisdiction is more enlarged; proceeding upon principles of universal justice; 
which must not be defeated by slight obstacles…. Formerly Courts of Law would not advert to such 
considerations: of late they have made some progress in that way; but they have not gone the length of 
Courts of Equity.’   
55 Stuart Banner, The Decline of Natural Law: How American Lawyers Once Used Natural Law and Why 
They Stopped (Oxford University Press, 2021). See also Edward S Corwin, “The “Higher Law” 
Background of American Constitutional Law” (1928) 42 Harv. L. Rev. 365; Thomas C Grey, “Origins of 
the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought” (1978) 30 Stan. L. 
Rev. 843 at 859-65; Philip A Hamburger, “Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American Constitutions” 
(1993) 102 Yale L. J. 907. See also State v. Joyner, 625 A.2d 791 at 814 (1993), noting that a 
commitment to natural law ‘pervaded eighteenth century legal thought throughout America, including 
Connecticut.’ 
56 Banner, supra note 55. 
57 Oliver Wendell Holmes, ‘Natural Law’ (1918) 32 Harv. L. Rev. 40 at 41.  
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These cases have not previously been discussed, as far as I am aware, despite the exceptionally 
clear treatment of unsourced principles of fairness as bona fide law. 
A set of cases from the 19th century involved a question of state constitutional law: whether a 
state that confiscates private property on behalf of the public owes the burdened person fair 
compensation. While the U.S. constitution mandates compensation, the fifth amendment, as 
originally written, restricted only the federal government from uncompensated takings, and it 
was not until after the civil war that the bill of rights was applied against state governments 
through the passage of the fourteenth amendment.58 Before then, many state constitutions 
included a provision analogous to the federal takings clause, but some omitted it.59 It was in this 
context that the New York chancery court derived a duty of compensation constraining 
legislative powers to take private property from a putative law of natural equity: 
I am not to be understood as denying a competent power in the legislature to take private 
property for necessary or useful public purposes… But to render the exercise of the 
power valid, a fair compensation must, in all cases, be previously made to the individuals 
affected, under some equitable assessment to be provided by law. This is a necessary 
qualification accompanying the exercise of legislative power, in taking private property 
for public uses; the limitation is admitted by the soundest authorities, and is adopted by 
all temperate and civilized governments, from a deep and universal sense of its justice. 
Grotius, (De Jur. B. & P. b. 8. ch. 14. s. 7.) Puffendorf, (De Jur. Nat. et Gent. b. 8. ch. 5. 
s. 7.) and Bynkershoeck, (Quæst. Jur. Pub. b. 2. ch. 15.) when speaking of the eminent 
domain of the sovereign… all lay it down as a clear principle of natural equity, that the 
individual, whose property is thus sacrificed, must be indemnified.60 
The court admits that there was no compensatory duty to be found in the New York constitution, 
unlike the constitutions of other states.61 Its justification for imposing the duty is a ‘principle of 
natural equity’ along with citations to Samuel von Pufendorf and Hugo Grotius who famously 
argued for natural laws of justice constraining the powers of government.62 
 
 
 
58 Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 at 247 (1833), held that the Bill of Rights 
did not apply to the States.  
59 See Orr v. Quimby, 54 N.H. 590 at 647 (1874). 
60 Gardner v. Vill. of Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162 at 166 (N.Y. Johns. Ch. 1816) [emphasis added].  
61 Ibid. The holding is interpretated by subsequent courts as deriving a compensatory duty from a ‘law of 
natural justice.’ See, e.g., discussion in Orr v. Quimby, 54 N.H. 590 at 647 (1874). 
62 See Hugo Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace, translated by William Whewell (Cambridge 
University Press, 1853) (1625) at BK. I, ch. I, sec. x, para 1: ‘The law of nature is a dictate of right reason, 
which points out that an act, according as it is or is not in conformity with rational nature, has in it a 
quality of moral baseness or moral necessity; and that, in consequence, such an act is either forbidden or 
enjoined.’ On Pufendorf’s view, see Christine Korsgaard, Sources of Normativity (Cambridge University 
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The holding in Gardner v Newburgh prevailed in New York until a constitutional provision 
requiring compensation was officially adopted.63 However, prior to adoption, at the proceedings 
of the New York convention in 1821, there was general concurrence that the provision was 
unnecessary.64 In Bradshaw v Rodgers, the court held that the constitutional provision was 
merely ‘declaratory’ of a principle of justice which applied independently in the case: 
[The act which allows taking of property without compensation] is directly opposed to the 
fifth article of the amendments of the constitution of the United States, which forbids the 
taking of private property for public use, without just compensation. The same inhibition to 
the power of the legislature, is contained in the late amendments to the constitution of this 
state. I do not rely on either, as having a binding constitutional force upon the act under 
consideration. The former related to the powers of the national government, and was 
intended as a restraint on that government; and the latter is not yet operative. But they are 
both declaratory of a great and fundamental principle of government; and any law violating 
that principle must be deemed a nullity, as it is against natural right and justice.65 
The court could not have stated in clearer terms that it took the ‘fundamental principle… [of] 
natural right and justice’ to legally constrain the legislature independently of the constitutional 
provisions requiring fair compensation, whether at the state or federal level: ‘I do not rely on 
either, as having binding constitutional force upon the act under consideration.’66 
The New York approach attracted notable critical commentary from a justice in New 
Hampshire. In Orr v Quimby, the judge rejects the New York approach, which it deems as 
having influenced New Hampshire67:  
New Hampshire is not the only state in which the constitutional view has been darkened 
by doctrines of natural justice, and theories of the highest law... The legislative power of 
New York was restricted by a duty of compensation, imposed not by a judicial 
interpretation of any particular passage of the constitution, not by any reasoning tending 
to show that “the supreme legislative power” was not to be understood in its English 
 
 
 
Press, 1996) at 7, 21-22, 28-30. 
63 The holding was not overruled in Bloodgood v. Mohawk & Hudson R.R. Co., 18 Wend. 9 (N.Y.  1837).  
64 Quimby, supra note 61 at 648-9. 
65 Bradshaw v. Rodgers, 20 Johns 103 at 106 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1882) [emphasis added]. See also Cairo & 
F.R. Co. v. Turner, 31 Ark. 494 at 499 (1876): ‘The duty to make compensation for property taken for 
public use, is regarded, by most enlightened jurists, as founded in the fundamental principles of natural 
right and justice, and as lying at the basis of all wise and just government, independent of all written 
constitutions or positive law.’ 
66 Bradshaw, supra note 65 at 106. 
67 Quimby, supra note 61 at 605.  
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sense…but by a judicial usurping administration of the higher law of natural justice.68 
The opinion is worth reading in full. It leaves a powerful impression that the judges disagreeing 
on the force of moral considerations fully understood the distinction between an extra-legal body 
of norms and bona fide juridical law. Likewise, they understood the distinction between juridical 
law derived from custom, tradition, statutes, legislative intent, or constitutional text, and juridical 
law derived, more controversially, from unsourced principles of justice.69 
There are other, more famous examples of appeals to laws of natural equity in American 
jurisprudence from the founding era.70 An overlooked example involved foreign debts. 
Immediately after American independence, the Virginian legislature passed an act purporting to 
discharge debts owed by American citizens to British creditors.71 The Virginia High Chancery 
Court held that the right to money owed to the ‘enemy’ could not be extinguished by the 
legislature of the debtor’s country because of the ‘laws of nature’ which ‘men, who did not 
ordain them, have not power to abrogate.’72 In response to an objection drawn from the Virginian 
Bill of Rights that ‘men are not bound by laws to which they have not, by themselves, or by 
representatives of their election, assented,’73 the court observed that the requirement of assent 
only applies to ‘positive law’ and not to the ‘law[s] of nature [which] harmonize with our innate 
notions of rectitude’ and ‘are, as Antigone says to Creon, in Sophocles, unwritten laws.’74 
Among the unwritten laws of justice, the court includes: ‘the prohibition to kill or wound our 
fellow men, to defame them, to invade their property, the praecepts to deal faithfully, to make 
reparation for injury.’75  
1.4 Summary 
 
 
 
68 Ibid at 647 [emphasis added]. 
69 Ibid at 609: ‘[J]udicial construction, that is, finding the legal meaning of words used by parliament 
[stands in] striking contrast with the power of holding that an unjust statute, when its legal meaning is 
found, is void on the ground that parliament has no authority to make an unjust law.’ 
70 See, e.g., Calder v Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (1798); Commonwealth v. Jennison, Proc. Mass. Hist. Soc’y. 
1873-75, at 293, 293-94 (1783); John D Cushing, “The Cushing Court and the Abolition of Slavery in 
Massachusetts: More Notes on the ‘Quock Walker Case’” (1961) 5 Am. J. Legal Hist. 118; Robin v. 
Hardaway, Jefferson 109 at 114 (Va. 1772); Gregory Ablavsky, “Making Indians “White”: The Judicial 
Abolition of Native Slavery in Revolutionary Virginia and its Racial Legacy” (2011) 159 U. Penn. L. 
Rev. 1457 at 1487. 
71 Page v. Pendleton, Wythe 211 at 212-3 (Va. High Ch. 1793). 
72 Ibid at 214 n.e. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid. 
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To reiterate a point conceded at the outset, a few illustrative cases and a sampling of historical 
scholarship is no substitute for a comprehensive assessment of how jurists have thought about 
law throughout history. Nevertheless, the verdict of historians and the explicit discussion of the 
laws of justice found in influential legal texts and famous judicial opinions justify taking the 
possibility seriously that moral principles were once commonly thought to exhibit a form of 
legality. At the very least, we have grounds for provisionally accepting the following 
observations for purposes of philosophical exploration: 
1. Judges (and other ordinary legal officials) have, in a natural context for the use of 
legal terminology, attributed legality to what they take to be moral principles, using 
these alleged laws of justice to provide compensation for property taken in the 
absence of constitutional requirements, to preclude states from interfering with 
financial obligations owed to foreign creditors, to ensure impartial adjudication, to 
determine equitable remedies, to establish rights to protection under law, to convict 
agents perpetrating injustice under the authority of enacted law, and in various other 
ways.  
2. These jurists did not explain the legality of moral principle by adverting to social 
facts, judicial choice, or more fundamental laws; on the contrary, they seemed to treat 
‘moral laws’ as self-evident, unchangeable, and applicable ex proprio vigore, 
expressly distinguishing such laws from enacted laws and customary laws. 
3. Jurists have cited the ‘laws of justice,’ along with ethical treatises which purport to 
clarify basic moral requirements, when using them to decide cases. 
4. The juridical idea that ‘what is good and equitable’ is both law and a necessary 
constraint on positive law (the ‘law of laws’) can be traced at least as far back as to a 
classical Roman conception of moral principles as lex naturae, the law of nature, 
which medieval and early modern civil lawyers likewise conceived of as a form of 
law revealed through rational reflection. The view seems to have influenced early 
Anglo-American constitutional jurisprudence. 
 
Note that these observations do not involve taking a definitive stand on the nature or 
normative content of moral principles. For our purposes, it is enough that the principles invoked 
as ‘laws of natural justice’ have a plausible claim to mirroring genuine moral requirements. 
Recall, for example, the principles requiring persons ‘to live honestly, to hurt no one, and to give 
everyone his due’; to avoid being ‘judge in their own cause’; to honor ‘the prohibition to kill or 
wound our fellow men, to defame them, to invade their property’ as well as ‘the praecepts to deal 
faithfully, to make reparation for injury.’ In other words, the principles invoked by jurists as 
‘moral law’ are not so obviously instances of ideology and social control masquerading as 
justice. In what follows, we can set modern legal practice largely aside or, rather, grant that the 
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‘laws of justice’ do not turn up with the same frequency or explicitness in contemporary 
jurisprudence.76  
§2 Hart-Dworkin on moral principles 
Before turning to our explanatory puzzle, it is worth briefly noting that the historical treatment of 
moral principles has not attracted much commentary from legal philosophers.77 Consider the 
following passage from Hart’s The Concept of Law: 
procedural standards such as ‘audi alteram partem’ ‘let no one be a judge in his own 
cause’ are thought of as requirements of justice, and in England and America are often 
referred to as principles of natural justice. This is so because they are guarantees of 
impartiality or objectivity, designed to secure that the law is applied to all those and only 
to those who are alike in the relevant respect marked out by the law itself.78 
Two famous principles of adjudication are mentioned in this passage, but the quoted remarks 
constitute the entirety of Hart’s discussion of the principles, which is surprisingly brief. As 
discussed, the principle no person shall be a judge in their own cause is associated with a famous 
line of English cases, and Hart’s claim that it was ‘often referred to as a principle of natural 
justice’ obscures the full picture. Influential jurists referred to the principle as a ‘law of justice,’ 
as an ‘unchangeable law,’ as ‘moral law,’ and, even, the ‘law of laws’ in the context of deciding 
cases.79 Moreover, these jurists purported to explain why principles of impartiality count as law, 
and their relationship to other laws of the system. These details matter for purposes of evaluating 
competing philosophical explanations of judicial practice. For example, the classification of 
principles of impartiality as law in a natural context for the use of juridical terminology bears 
(even if non-decisively) on whether judges have treated these principles as ‘extra-legal’ bases for 
 
 
 
76 On natural law’s decline in Anglo-American jurisprudence, see Banner, supra note 55. The general 
disappearance of natural law reasoning is contestable. For example, von Hippel provides examples of 
post-1947 German courts invoking ‘moral law’, ‘material justice’, and ‘suprapositive principles of justice 
which underlie all written law’; see Ernst von Hippel, “The Role of Natural Law in the Legal Decisions of 
the German Federal Republic” (1959) 42 Nat. L. F. 106 at 113, 111-15. See also Kif Augustine Adams, 
“What is Just?: The Rule of Law and Natural Law in the Trials of Former East German Border Guards” 
(1992) 29 Stan. J. Int’l L. 271 at 297, 301. 
77 Natural law theorists seem aware of this history but have not deployed it in philosophical argument. 
Finnis observes in passing that ‘pre-modern legal vocabulary’ seemed connected to justice, but does not 
articulate for positivists a challenge based on this conceptual history; see John Finnis, Natural Law & 
Natural Rights, 2nd ed (Oxford University Press, 2011) at 206-10. See also Lon Fuller, “Positivism and 
Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart” (1958) 71 Harv. L. Rev. 630 at 646-60; Jonathan Crowe, 
Natural Law and the Nature of Law (Cambridge University Press, 2019).   
78  Hart, supra note 4 at 160.  
79 The leading precedent being Dr. Bonham’s Case, [1610] 77 E.R. 646. See discussion in §1.3. 
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deciding cases.80 And a characterization of the principles as unchangeable laws casts doubt on 
the idea that jurists treated the legality of the principles as dependent on local customs. 
Even Dworkin’s famous challenge for positivists based on the role of equitable principles 
in adjudication overlooks historical practice. Various details of the argument can be suppressed, 
but its central and least question-begging observation is that modern judges tasked with figuring 
out what the law is frequently base their conclusions partly on considerations of justice.81 For 
example, a judge might regard the fact that a contractual provision takes ‘unfair’ advantage of 
the buyer as a reason for deeming the provision unenforceable as a matter of law.82 So, the 
argument goes, moral principles appear to be a ground of law. The standard positivist replies to 
Dworkin’s challenge are well-known. ‘Inclusive’ positivists point out that the moral principles in 
question may be law (or determinants of law) not on moral grounds but in virtue of the social 
fact that prior judges have embraced the principles.83 ‘Exclusive’ positivists point out that judges 
rely on all kinds of extra-legal rules or principles in adjudication (principles of logic, grammar, 
statistics, and, indeed, morality), but that does not necessarily make the relied-on principles 
law.84 Dworkin finds himself vulnerable to these replies for focusing on just one aspect of 
judicial reasoning in relation to moral principles (adjudicative reliance), in a small selection of 
illustrative cases (two in Model of Rules) from a unique area of law (common law), in a unique 
legal system (American), at a unique point in time (the contemporary period).85 As §1 highlights, 
 
 
 
80 Hart does engage and critique the natural law theorists, but attends to philosophical arguments, not the 
actual practice of law and ordinary juristic intuition; see Hart, supra note 4 at 185-213. See also HLA 
Hart, “Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals” (1958) 71 Harv. L. Rev. 593 at 594-95. As I 
argue below, what needs to be explained is the convictions of ordinary legal officials. 
81 Dworkin develops the argument in several classic articles; see sources cited, supra note 5. For a useful 
summary of the core of Dworkin’s challenge, see Carlos S Nino, “Dworkin and Legal Positivism” (1980) 
89 Mind 519.   
82 See e.g., Henningsen v Bloomfield Motors, inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960); Dworkin, “Model of Rules,” 
supra note 5 at 20-25.  
83 See e.g., Jules L Coleman, The Practice of Principle: In Defense of a Pragmatist Approach to Legal 
Theory (Oxford University Pres, 2001) at 67-68, 103-19, 151-52; Wil Waluchow, Inclusive Legal 
Positivism (Oxford University Press, 1994) at 185-6. 
84 See e.g., Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms at 152-54, 2nd ed (Oxford University Press, 1990); 
Scott J Shapiro, Legality (Harvard University Press, 2011) at 272. 
85 Dworkin, “Model of Rules,” supra note 5 at 20-25. Dworkin relies on Henningsen v. Bloomfield 
Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960), where the legal question concerned the scope of an automobile 
manufacturer’s ability to contractually limit its liability. The court based its interpretation of the warranty 
on the fact that ‘courts generally refuse to lend themselves to the enforcement of a ‘bargain’ in which one 
party has unjustly taken advantage of the economic necessities of the other’; ibid at 86. Dworkin’s other 
main example is Riggs v. Palmer. 22 N.E. 188 at 189 (N.Y. 1889). ‘In Riggs, the court cited the principle 
that no man may profit from his own wrong as a background standard against which to read the statute of 
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ordinary jurists from a broad range of legal systems have treated moral principles in more 
complex ways than simply relying on them in adjudication. In §4, I argue that the complexion of 
the Hart-Dworkin debate seems to change when viewed through the lens of legal history. The 
limited point for now is that that the history of the laws of justice does not receive much 
consideration under the terms of this classic debate. 
 
§3 Positivism’s trilemma assuming a historically continuous concept of law 
An adequate account of the nature of legality should be able to explain why jurists in prior legal 
systems classified moral principles as law. This section explores the prospects of a positivist-
friendly explanation that starts with the assumption that classical Romans, early modern 
Europeans, and founding-era Americans shared the same concept of law as contemporary jurists 
(henceforth, ‘the common concept assumption’). The assumption limits the positivist to the 
following three explanatory strategies: (i) vindicate the legal intuitions of past jurists by appeal to 
positivist criteria for law; (ii) dismiss their judgments as insincere; or (iii) convict them of legal 
error. The positivist can always adopt a mixed approach, explaining some of the judgments as 
true, others as insincere, and still others as mistaken. But that is no mark against the taxonomy or 
the overall argument of this section when one of its central points is that we should seek a unified 
explanation for a phenomenon that appears unified: jurists across the centuries have behaved in 
very similar ways and said very similar things about the laws of justice. Moreover, the problems 
with each of the three explanatory strategies I discuss below are not of the kind to be solved by 
combining strategies.  
3.1 Conventionalism 
 
 
 
wills and in this way justified a new interpretation of that statute.’ Dworkin, “Model of Rules,” supra note 
5 at 29. Dworkin argues that the positivist cannot capture the legality of the principles relied on in Riggs 
and Henningsen: 
The positivist cannot defend his theory … by fiat; if principles are not amenable to a [positivist] 
test he must show some other reason why they cannot count as law. Since principles seem to play 
a role in arguments about legal obligation (witness, again, Riggs and Henningsen), a model that 
provides for that role has some initial advantage over one that excludes it.  
Ibid at 37. He continues: 
Most rules of law, according to Hart, are valid because some competent institution enacted 
them…. But this test of pedigree will not work for the Riggs and Henningsen principles. The 
origin of these as legal principles lies not in a particular decision of some legislature or court, but 
in a sense of appropriateness developed in the profession and the public over time.  
Ibid at 41. It is widely appreciated that Dworkin misinterprets Hart’s view by ignoring the possibility of 
general customs being a source of valid law. The ‘sense of appropriateness’ in the profession may be 
deference to custom, rather than owing to the morality of the relevant principles independently of custom.  
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Consider, first, the prospects of explaining the observed legal judgements in terms of the kinds of 
social facts that positivists think determine the law. The principles that early modern civilian and 
common lawyers described as ‘natural laws’ were widely followed, and it may have been general 
compliance with the principles, rather than their moral content, that determined their legality. Put 
differently, the principles in question may have been a form of ‘customary law,’ consistent with 
the truth of legal positivism.86 Alternatively, jurists who decided cases by appeal to equitable 
principles may have been exercising law-making powers they enjoyed based on customary rules 
of adjudication. These broadly ‘conventionalist’ strategies are familiar from positivist replies to 
Dworkin’s original challenge based on modern practice.87  
CONVENTIONALISM 
Jurists who classified principles of justice as law did so because the 
principles were widely embraced, or because local customs 
authorized these jurists to make new law. 
The conventionalist reply may have been a satisfactory response to Dworkin’s challenge, 
but its present application is contestable for at least two reasons. First, the evidence indicates that 
jurists did not advert to social facts to explain the ‘laws of justice.’ Their failure to do so is 
significant because in general judges and other legal experts readily appeal to such facts in 
explanation. When the legality of a rule or principle is based on precedent, prior judicial 
recognition, or law-making authority, judges appreciate the importance of making these 
explanatory connections explicit and are adept at doing so. Furthermore, judges know how to 
deem a rule or imperative ‘extra-legal’ or as stemming from ‘powers outside of law.’88 So, the 
conventionalist owes us an explanation for why judges invoking the ‘laws of justice’ were not 
similarly disposed to explain the legality of principles of fairness or impartiality in terms of 
background conventions, customs, or law-making powers.  
Second, and more worryingly, the proposal flatly contradicts explicit juristic commentary 
on the nature of the moral laws, commentary which strongly suggests that jurists did not believe 
that the legal status of moral principles depends on local customs. Judges have described the 
laws of justice as an original basis for deciding cases while invoking principles not previously 
recognized by courts.89 In the New York takings case described earlier, the court admits that the 
state constitution is not the source of the law that obliges the state to compensate a private party 
 
 
 
86 We can grant for argument’s sake that the content of the relevant principles can be captured by a 
customary rule. 
87 See Coleman, supra note 83 at 67-68; Waluchow, supra note 83 at 185-86. 
88 See, e.g., Hamburger’s account of the treatment of binding Royal prerogatives by English courts. Philip 
Hamburger, Law and Judicial Duty (Harvard University Press, 2008) at 22-26. With or without statutory 
foundations, the King’s prerogatives were often deemed ‘extra-legal’ imperatives. 
89 See text accompanying notes 48, 60, 65 above. 
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for publicly possessed property.90 The constitution is acknowledged as being ‘silent’ on the 
matter.91 The common law, construed as a ‘mere mass of customs’ as one New Hampshire court 
put it, cannot explain a judge’s use of the ‘laws of natural justice’ to constrain the legislature.92 
Furthermore, jurists were willing to declare that ‘no power on earth’—which includes, one 
assumes, the power of shifting legal conventions in the jurisdiction—could invalidate such moral 
laws or the judge’s responsibility to apply them.93 ‘Man-made law,’ we are told, cannot go 
against moral law.94 The unwritten laws of justice, according to one court, do not require the 
‘assent’ of a legislature or the general public to be legally binding on both.95 Recall the 
especially direct terms in which Coke describes the ‘Lex aeterna, the moral law, called also the 
law of nature,’ as ‘immutable… and… part of the laws of England.’96 
Likewise, when classical Roman magistrates and jurisconsults reasoned about the legal 
status of moral principles, they seem to have explicitly distinguished laws derived from custom 
from the ‘laws of nature,’ even where the two coincided.97 And, as Helmholz notes, early 
modern European courts distinguished principles they believed were implicit in custom from 
principles believed to be the laws of reason and justice with universal application, the latter 
sometimes contradicting the prevailing customary norms.98 Moreover, ‘overlap between 
“positive” and natural law’ was seen as ‘a sign of the influence of the latter, not an indication of 
[natural law’s] lack of consequence.’99 Accordingly, it seems anachronistic to superimpose on 
these jurists a commitment to only recognizing the legal validity of moral principles if custom 
allows it.  
The positivist can always maintain that past jurists were confused about why the laws of 
justice count as law, but then the explanation becomes a version of error theory. Error-theoretic 
explanatory strategies generate distinct problems that I discuss separately in §3.3. The point for 
now is that a purely vindicating strategy like CONVENTIONALISM that portrays jurists as having 
 
 
 
90 See text accompanying note 60 above. 
91 Quimby, supra note 61 at 605, 647. See also Cairo & F.R. Co. v. Turner, 31 Ark. 494 at 500 (1876), 
observing that ‘[t]he duty to make compensation for property taken for public use, is regarded, by most 
enlightened jurists, as founded in the fundamental principles of natural right and justice, and as lying at 
the basis of all wise and just government, independent of all written constitutions or positive law.’ 
92 Quimby, supra note 61 at 636. 
93 Pendleton, supra note 71 at 213.   
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Calvin’s case, supra note 48 at 392. 
97 See text accompanying note 21 above.  
98 See text accompanying notes 29-39 above. 
99 Helmholz, supra note 29 at 79-80. 
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classified moral principles as law due to legal customs (or law-making powers) is very hard to 
square with their actual commentary. 
3.2 Fictionalism  
Consider, next, a broadly fictionalist approach to explaining the highlighted legal usage.100 
FICTIONALISM 
Judges who invoked the ‘laws of justice’ were aware that moral 
principles aren’t really law. Their pretense was aimed at promoting 
justice while keeping up the façade of strict obedience to law. Since 
such talk among jurists is insincere, it is entirely compatible with the 
true grounds of legality being social.101 
 
 
 
100 On the different varieties of fictionalism, see Stephen Yablo, “Go Figure: A Path Through 
Fictionalism” (2001) 25 Midwest Stud. Phil. 72. The specific brand of fictionalism I have in mind, here, 
is ‘instrumentalist’ in Yablo’s taxonomy: judges do not intend the literal content of their legal assertions, 
while intending to convey the impression that they are speaking literally for instrumental reasons.  A 
different kind of view which Yablo calls ‘metafictionalism’ is not this section’s intended target. This view 
portrays speakers as intending to communicate something other than the literal assertion. E.g., a 
metafictionalist might paraphrase ‘Sherlock Holmes lives in London’ as ‘according to the fictional work 
by Arthur Conan Doyle, Sherlock Holmes lives in London.’ A metafictionalist account of a set of claims 
does not treat those claims as false or intentionally misleading. Metafictionalist accounts of legal assertion 
are best analyzed under the node of conventionalism in my taxonomy. E.g., a metafictionalist might argue 
that judges who asserted ‘moral principles are law’ really intended to say something like ‘around here, we 
treat moral principles as law’ which the positivist might try to vindicate as true. Such views are not 
supported by the contextual or linguistic evidence for reasons discussed in §3.1. 
101 See, e.g., Andrei Marmor, Philosophy of Law (Princeton University Press, 2010) at 90, who observes 
that judicial reliance on moral principles ‘has the status of an inconvenient truth… [a]nd this 
inconvenience puts judges under considerable pressure to coat the making of new law in the rhetoric of 
law application.’ See also Brian Leiter, “Explaining Theoretical Disagreement” (2009) 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
1215 at 1224-5; Scott J Shapiro, “The “Hart-Dworkin” Debate: A Short Guide for the Perplexed” in A 
Ripstein, ed, Ronald Dworkin (Cambridge University Press, 2007) at 39-40; David Plunkett & Timothy 
Sundell, “Dworkin’s Interpretivism and the Pragmatics of Legal Disputes” (2013) 19 Legal Theory 242. 
Plunkett and Sundell defend a general metasemantics for legal terms which, I would argue, is aptly 
characterized as a kind of qualified fictionalism about legal discourse. They argue that a central feature of 
using legal language is negotiating the meaning of ‘law’ by deliberately using it in ways that flout the 
conventional criteria associated with the term’s use. There is a kind of license, in other words, possibly 
appreciated by core participants in the linguistic practice, to make claims of law the speaker knows to be 
false (e.g., ‘the principles of justice are law’) but hopes will eventually be accepted by others resulting in 
a shift in the meaning of legal expressions. The Plunkett & Sundell proposal, on the fictionalist 
interpretation, attributes considerable lack of forthrightness to core participants in legal practice and is 
vulnerable to the objections I go on to raise. 
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Charges of legal disingenuousness can vary in severity.102 Brian Leiter observes that a harsher 
version of this charge implies conscious dishonesty, whereas a milder version attributes self-
deception ‘because of the familiar psychological and emotional influences on human decision-
making in the heat of a legal dispute.’103 The milder notion that jurists might be mistaken due to 
motivated reasoning amounts to a kind of error theory, which I’ll consider in the section to 
follow. For now, fictionalism in my stipulated sense involves the sharper accusation of conscious 
deception. 
There are several problems with the proposal which together make FICTIONALISM seem 
evasive and unsatisfying. First, the fictionalist posits a deliberate fraud that has endured over 
many centuries, across a wide range of jurisdictions, in which Roman jurisconsults, famous 
English jurists, and founding-era American judges have all been complicit. Yet there are no 
‘winks’ and ‘nods’ to be found in the behavioral evidence. There are no contexts, including 
outside the courtroom or in private correspondence, where jurists like Coke and Holt 
acknowledge their alleged pretense, as far as we are aware. And historians seem to have taken 
these jurists at their word. To be sure, contemporary judges sometimes admit to having made 
exaggerated claims about the extent of legal determinacy and the like.104 But those who invoked 
laws of reason and fairness seem sincere in their commentary, and the earnestness of these jurists 
constitutes evidence against FICTIONALISM, even if it isn’t decisive evidence.  
Second, the more uncharitable an explanation, the more closely it must be examined to 
ensure it isn’t motivated solely by a desire to save one’s preferred theory from inconvenient 
facts; and it is unclear what evidence the fictionalist could possibly draw on to motivate this 
specific charge of rampant dishonesty. To be sure, bad faith is often inferable from the kinds of 
arguments legal officials offer in defense of their legal claims. Judges frequently make claims 
about what precedent establishes or what the empirical evidence suggests that seem motivated by 
the judge’s political preferences rather than a considered take on law and fact.105 In such cases, 
charges of bad faith are plausible precisely because they are based on a critical examination of 
the judge’s arguments. But there are no such arguments to critique in the case of jurists 
sympathetic to the laws of justice, since they seem to have treated the legality of moral principles 
as basic, intuitive, and not requiring independent justification. The laws of justice and 
impartiality ‘do not admit of proof by reason and argument but bear with them their own 
evidence.’106 In other words, these jurists do not seem to be behaving in ways that fit the 
 
 
 
102 Leiter, supra note 101 at 1224-5. 
103 Ibid at 1225. 
104 Ibid at 1225. 
105 Ibid at 1247. Leiter is surely right that a failure to notice how often judges engage in ‘interpretive 
opportunism’ reflects ‘a kind of naivety about legal practice.’ Ibid at 1242-46. 
106 See Corwin, supra note 46 at 103-04, citing John Fortescue, Henry VI’s Chief Justice, in De Laudibus.  
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stereotype of bad faith judging; and, in any case, it would be unreasonable to convict past jurists 
of dishonesty—conveniently those whose legal intuitions conflict with positivism—based on 
nothing more than a stereotype. 
Third, fictionalism’s assumptions about the motives of jurists are questionable. There 
may be good reasons for contemporary judges to be less than transparent about the role of moral 
considerations in law. For example, modern American judges might have reasons for 
misrepresenting their extra-legal reliance on moral principles in a pluralistic democracy 
characterized by pervasive moral disagreement.107 But classical Roman jurisconsults and early 
modern civilian lawyers, one imagines, would have been far less sensitive to democratic values 
or problems of moral pluralism.108 At the very least, it is unclear what powerful reason they 
would have had to pretend, so persistently, that principles of fairness and equity are law. The 
fictionalist gambit seems markedly anachronistic.  
3.3 Error theory 
Since the previous two strategies are subject to serious challenge, a positivist committed to the 
common concept assumption may be tempted to characterize the moral law conviction as a 
pervasive error. 
ERROR THEORY 
Jurists who believed that some moral principles are universally valid 
law were all mistaken.  
The error theorist avoids the problems facing the conventionalist and the fictionalist by taking the 
juristic claims and contextual evidence at face value. But the error theory confronts a different 
problem by incurring a unique explanatory burden that the positivist is not well-placed to meet—
that of explaining, in terms of the nature and determinants of legality, why legal experts would 
have mistakenly assumed that moral principles are a form of basic and a priori law.  
 We can begin by motivating the explanatory burden. The fact that jurists make mistakes 
about the law, including about its sources, content, or righteousness, can hardly be denied. But 
one would expect certain common or widespread errors about legal content to be reasonably 
related to the determinants of legality.109 In other words, a theory of the grounds of law can be 
 
 
 
107 See generally Scott Altman, “Beyond Candor” (1990) 89 Mich. L. Rev. 296.  
108 Accordingly, when Marmor, supra note 101 at 90, observes that the fact that judges rely on moral 
principles is an ‘inconvenient truth’, surely, the point must be limited to contemporary jurisdictions. For 
many centuries, judges were transparent about deciding cases based on moral principles. 
109 After all, when large numbers of individuals with apparent expertise about a subject (say, combustion) 
end up with false beliefs (consider the 18th century belief in phlogiston), such beliefs are typically 
explainable as good faith and understandable errors (phlogiston seemed to explain genuine and previously 
unexplained features of combustion). See Victor D Boantza & Ofer Gal, “The “Absolute Existence” of 
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evaluated based on, among other criteria, how well the theory explains the systematic errors 
about the law it implies. For example, a theory according to which the law is fundamentally 
determined by people’s intentions seems well-placed to explain why jurists and other legal 
experts tend to misidentify the law when the intentions of relevant individuals, say, constitutional 
framers or legislators, are hard to discern. Other kinds of errors may not be so easily explained, 
however. And a theory is less than satisfying if it implies not just that jurists are legally 
mistaken, but that their mistakes are inexplicably arbitrary, bearing little to no connection to the 
nature of law.110 More generally, Kovacs argues based on a principle of interpretive charity that a 
philosophical error theory is only as plausible as the explanations it provides for (a) why 
ordinary, non-philosophical beliefs systematically come apart from the truth and (b) why the 
mistaken beliefs remain more or less reasonable.111 
Another way to motivate the explanatory burden is by analogy to a demand for 
explanation pressed by positivists against anti-positivists. Mainstream varieties of anti-positivism 
take moral facts to essentially constrain legal content in ways that render grossly immoral laws 
impossible. These views seem to entail that many immoral laws upheld by contemporary judges 
were not really law: fugitive slave laws, racial segregation laws, overharsh criminal laws, and so 
on.112 Anti-positivism thus seems inconsistent with ordinary legal intuition, and positivists 
rightly observe that, at the very least, the anti-positivist bears a burden of explaining why legal 
experts make the pervasive error of thinking an unjust law is still law. For analogous reasons, 
positivists need to explain why past jurists were mistakenly drawn to the view that moral 
principles exhibit an a priori form of legality.  
This genuine explanatory burden is not one that the positivist is well-positioned to meet. 
For example, the positivist might be tempted to invoke the subtlety of philosophical arguments 
as an explanation. Perhaps jurists over the centuries were simply misled by unsound arguments 
developed by philosophers of natural law, including Aristotle, Aquinas, Grotius, and others—
arguments concerning law’s function, legal determinacy in hard cases, and so on. These complex 
 
 
 
Phlogiston: The Losing Party’s Point of View” (2011) 4 British J. Hist. Sci. 317.  
110 See generally Eli Hirsch, “Against Revisionary Ontology” (2002) 30 Phil. Topics 103 at 116, arguing 
that considerations of charity entail that philosophers should interpret people’s utterances without 
attributing unexplained a priori errors to them; and Dan Korman, “Eliminativism and the Challenge from 
Folk Beliefs” (2009) 43 Noûs 242, describing the philosophical challenge of explaining folk error.  
111 David M Kovacs, “How to be an Uncompromising Revisionary Ontologist” (2019) 198 Synthese 
2129. 
112 For general discussion, see Emad H Atiq, “There are No Easy Counterexamples to Legal Anti-
positivism” (2020) 17 J. Ethics & Soc. Phil. 1: ‘While it would indeed be question begging to assume 
anti-positivism is refuted by simply pointing to these cases of apparent legality, the problem for the anti-
positivist is that it is very hard to explain away (as widespread error) judgments made by a diverse range 
of experts and nonexperts about law.’ 
Forthcoming in Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 26 
 
 
 
arguments are mistaken, according to the positivist, but they are not obviously mistaken.113 
Accordingly, the observed error among jurists who thought unsourced principles of justice are 
law can be explained charitably: reasonable people can easily be misled by philosophical 
considerations.  
 The problem with the ‘philosophy is hard’ response is that it is very unlikely that the 
broad range of ordinary jurists who have all been drawn to the laws of justice were immersed in 
abstract philosophy, enough to be moved by the sheer force of argument alone. Helmholz notes 
that while it can be surmised that founding-era American jurists had some exposure to the work 
of Grotius, Pufendorf, and other natural law theorists: ‘the extent of this contact with the law of 
nature was nothing to brag about. It was almost incidental, not professional.’114 Similarly, 
Hamburger writes that most English jurists in the 17th century ‘were blissfully ignorant of 
ponderous natural-law tomes’ and yet ‘non-technical features of natural-law analysis were 
widely … received.’115 Philosophical arguments tend to influence ordinary or commonly held 
beliefs when the arguments justify claims that seem independently intuitive. Consider arguments 
for the existence of free will. No doubt such arguments have found a receptive audience outside 
of philosophy. But belief in free will, however mistaken, can hardly be explained away as an 
error transmitted to the many by the sheer force of philosophical argument. Likewise, while 
jurists committed to the laws of justice may have had incidental exposure to philosophical 
considerations, they presumably found the existence of such laws independently intuitive. 
Another way to put it is that the existence of universally valid laws of justice must have been 
concordant with their concept of law.116 Hence, what needs to be explained is why the ‘laws of 
justice’ seemed intuitive in this way to a wide range of legal officials. 
 
 
 
113 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pushing me on this point. 
114 Helmholz, supra note 29 at 130. Helmholz concludes that it is ‘hard to arrive at a fully satisfactory 
explanation for what the authors of American independence knew’ that would account for their broad 
sympathies towards the idea of unwritten laws of justice. Ibid at 128. 
115 Hamburger, supra note 47 at 2093. See also JGA Pocock, Politics, Language and Time: Essays on 
Political Thought and History (University of Chicago Press, 1971) at 5-6, 25-27, 144. 
116 Recent experimental work on the ‘folk’ concept of law finds support for the ‘moral law’ intuition 
among 218 undergraduates who had not yet taken any courses in legal philosophy. Brian Flanagan & Ivan 
R Hannikainen, “The Folk Concept of Law: Law is Intrinsically Moral” (forthcoming) Australasian J. 
Phil. Flanagan & Hannikainen surveyed students on the legality of immoral laws, and report verdicts 
consistent with what they describe as a ‘natural law’ concept of law:  
consistently with a natural law view, the more that participants believed the marriage ban to be 
wrong, the more likely they were to deny that it was truly law… Studies 1 and 2 demonstrated 
that people tend to deny the lawfulness of gravely immoral statutes, as predicted by natural law 
theorists. 
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This is a convenient juncture at which to revisit a possibility raised in our discussion of 
fictionalism: namely, that the mistaken beliefs may be due to wishful thinking or motivated 
reasoning. The positivist might be tempted by a just-so story along the following lines:  
When jurists encountered cases where the law leads to unjust results, they ignored the 
(positive) law and decided the case based on moral norms that they wished were law. 
Sooner or later, they became confused and started supposing that what morality requires 
is the law, independently of their own agency.  
Ziva Kunda, in her foundational work on the psychology of motivated reasoning, documents the 
‘considerable evidence that people are more likely to arrive at conclusions that they want to 
arrive at’ but notes that ‘their ability to do so is constrained by their ability to construct 
seemingly reasonable justifications for these conclusions.’117 The problem for the positivist’s 
motivated reasoning story is that jurists who treated moral principles as law made no attempt to 
justify their judgments in social terms. On the contrary, they expressly denied that moral laws are 
derived from socially embraced rules or dependent on custom.118 Their legal intuitions seem 
insensitive to what, according to positivism, determines whether a rule is law or not—social 
facts. In other words, juridical reasoning concerning the laws of justice does not conform to the 
recognizable structure of motivated reasoning, at least if we assume a positivist framework for 
law.119  
Ultimately, the problem for the error theory can be summarized as follows. The 
affirmative claims that make up positivism as a theory of law hamstring the error theorist’s 
ability to explain why jurists would consistently and so pervasively make the specific error of 
thinking, on seemingly intuitive or a priori grounds, that moral principles are a form of law. If a 
rule’s legality is predicated on its being suitably obeyed or derived from more fundamental rules 
that attract obedience, this renders puzzling why judges would have embraced moral principles 
as law while explicitly denying that their legality depends on contingent social facts like 
 
 
 
Ibid at 8-10. In fact, asked outright ‘a large majority (64.4%) rejected the view that, ultimately, law is just 
a matter of concrete social facts.’ Ibid at 11. 
117 Ziva Kunda, “The Case for Motivated Reasoning” (1990) 108 Psychol. Bull. 480 at 480. 
118 See §1. 
119 Leiter, supra note 101 at 1247, points out that judges often take inconsistent positions across cases and 
suggests that ‘the jurists may simply be motivated subconsciously by their moral view of the merits, such 
that they convince themselves of the legal propriety of their preferred outcome.’ Leiter is surely right. 
This sort of thing happens all the time. The problem facing the motivated reasoning story in the present 
context, however, is that the judges in question made no effort to rationalize the existence of moral laws 
in terms of what positivists claim are the true grounds of legality. By contrast, judges usually do try to 
rationalize inconsistent legal positions based on precedent and the like, just as Kunda suggests about 
motivated reasoning generally. 
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obedience. Note that the argument of this section is entirely consistent with jurists being 
mistaken about the legality of moral principles. The target has not been error-theoretic accounts 
generally, but an error theory that is based on positivism, which, I’ve argued, lacks a plausible 
theory of error. Positivism sheds no light on why legal experts ended up confused in the precise 
way the error theorist portrays them as having been—in particular, why the good and the right 
appeared to these judges in the guise of legality. And a general theory of law should avoid 
attributing an arbitrary-seeming error to a broad range of jurists, even ones temporally distant 
from us. 
§4 The implications of conceptual change 
The explanatory strategies considered so far for reconciling the legal historical facts with 
positivism seem weak. Conventionalists interpret juristic appeals to the laws of justice as based 
on local customs, contradicting the explicit commentary of jurists. Fictionalists attribute deceit 
based on a sweeping and undermotivated generalization. Error theorists charge a wide range of 
legal officials with an unexplained and arbitrary-seeming error. All three approaches assume that 
there has been no substantial shift in the meaning of legal terminology over time; and perhaps the 
problem lies with this assumption. An alternative explanatory strategy involves conceding that 
the term ‘law’ (or ‘lex’ or ‘jus’) was used historically with a different intension, while 
maintaining that law in the modern sense is correctly analyzed in positivistic terms. After all, the 
concepts that attach to our words are arguably fixed by the dispositions of language users, and 
when those dispositions change (as they plausibly did in the case of ‘law’), so do the concepts 
expressed.120 It would be consistent with positivism’s truth that legal terminology once expressed 
a concept with robust moral content—call it LAWOLDE. 
The proposal has several virtues. The general phenomenon of conceptual evolution (or 
referential change) is independently well-motivated.121 And the resulting explanation of the 
historical facts does not involve ignoring juridical commentary on the ‘laws’ of justice. Nor does 
it involve attributing arbitrary legal intuitions to legal experts; it may well have been a 
conceptual truth about LAWOLDE that basic principles of fairness fall under the concept. For these 
reasons, REFERENCE-SHIFT seems to me to be the most plausible approach for the positivist to 
take if, as the evidence suggests, moral principles were widely described using juridical 
 
 
 
120 On usage facts determining meaning facts, see generally, Paul Horwich, Meaning (Oxford University 
Press, 1998); Schroeter & Schroeter, supra note 2.  
121 See generally Joshua Glasgow, “Conceptual Revolution” in T Marques & A Wikforss, eds, Shifting 
Concepts: The Philosophy and Psychology of Conceptual Variability (Oxford University Press, 2020) 
147; John P Burgess, “Madagascar Revisited” (2014) 74 Analysis 195.  
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vocabulary. And there are occasional hints (though only hints) in familiar positivist texts that the 
target of analysis may be a uniquely modern concept of law.122  
While this strategy does seem like the best option for the positivist, it is not without cost. 
Most saliently, positivism’s truth seems parochial in a way that requires reconceptualizing the 
philosophical dialectic. If legal terminology has shifted in meaning, it would be a mistake to 
construe contemporary legal philosophers as analyzing a subject they share with their historical 
counterparts. The account of the referent of ‘law’ (or ‘nomos’ or ‘jus’ …) offered by Aristotle, 
Aquinas, Grotius, or Pufendorf may well have been appropriate for its time, just as Hart’s might 
be today. This is far from the standard picture of how legal philosophy has progressed.  
Furthermore, positivists have some work to do in fleshing out the details of the view. We 
need an account of conceptual transition—or how the juristic term ‘law’ came to refer to a 
subject amenable to positivistic analysis when it originally expressed a concept analytically tied 
to morality. Since my aim in this paper is not to defend positivism, I leave further development 
of the view to positivists. It is worth noting, however, that certain ways of filling out the details 
will entail new theoretical challenges. Consider the fact that legal terminology serves important 
functions, including a coordinating function in circumstances of disagreement.123 LAWOLDE may 
well have been a more useful concept for communities to glom on to in search of regulative 
norms than LAWPOSITIVE in the early days of legal systems, when there was not much codified or 
customary law to rely on. A concept defined partly in terms of a priori moral principles might 
have granted greater (and necessary) flexibility to legal decision-makers. One might imagine that 
over time, as the less controversial principles became codified or absorbed into custom, well-
organized communities became more concerned with restraining jurists from deviating from 
time-honored principles than with filling gaps in positive law. In other words, it seems plausible 
that the dispositions of legal language users changed as their priorities shifted in ways that might 
explain the transition from LAWOLDE to LAWPOSITIVE. Indeed, something like this account has 
recently been proposed as an explanation for the decline of natural law reasoning in American 
jurisprudence.124   
 
 
 
122 Hart in his postscript describes ‘the salient features of a modern municipal legal system’ as the 
‘starting-point’ for his project; see Hart, supra note 4 at 240 [emphasis added]. Raz observes in passing 
that past cultures may have had a different concept of law, but does not comment on how it was different 
(let alone that the concept might have been non-positivist in nature) or its significance for the modern 
conception; see Joseph Raz, “Can There be a Theory of Law” in Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Law 
and Legal Theory (Wiley-Blackwell, 2004) 328. Thanks to Hillary Nye for highlighting Raz’s discussion. 
123 See generally Joseph Raz, “Authority, Law & Morality” (1985) 68 The Monist 295 at 299.  
124 See Banner, supra note 55. Banner argues that an expansion in case reporting and precedential law 
crowded out natural law in American jurisprudence. 
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While plausible, an account along these lines invariably draws attention to the possibility 
that our contemporary concept of law may not be completely denuded of moral content. For even 
if dispositions to use legal terminology tend towards a positivist-friendly concept as legal 
systems become increasingly sophisticated, a tendency is hardly a fait accompli. In fact, some of 
the evidence anti-positivists have traditionally offered against positivism may be reconceived as 
evidence suggesting that our contemporary concept of juridical law retains moral traces of 
LAWOLDE. Put differently, the above account of semantic change may turn out to be more grist for 
the anti-positivist mill.  
As an illustration, we can revisit Dworkin’s objection to positivism based on adjudicative 
reliance on moral principles. When determining the enforceability of a contract, a modern judge 
might refuse to enforce the contract or a contractual provision on the basis that courts cannot be 
‘used as instruments of injustice.’125 So, the argument goes (roughly), positivism seems false: 
facts concerning what the law is are partly determined by moral facts—what is just and fair—
independently of the social facts concerning what we do around here.126 We have already 
discussed well-known positivist replies to Dworkin’s challenge. These include that mere reliance 
on a moral principle in adjudication does not establish its legality, and that judges may be 
treating the principles as law on purely social grounds. Whether these responses ultimately 
succeed is not presently at issue. The limited point for present purposes is that the possibility of 
REFERENCE-SHIFT arms the anti-positivist with new resources for defending her interpretation of 
the behavior of modern judges. The anti-positivist can invoke conceptual history—a history that 
a positivist committed to REFERENCE-SHIFT largely concedes—in defense of the view that 
contemporary judges are implicitly treating moral principles as law and on purely moral grounds. 
After all, our legal forebearers employed a concept that empowered then not just to rely on moral 
principles in adjudication but to expressly refer to those principles as, for example, ‘the laws of 
England.’ It seems reasonable to assume that this history influences contemporary adjudication, 
especially if modern judges are disposed to defer to prior jurists on whether and why moral 
principles count as law.127 If these deference dispositions hold (a big ‘if’ to be sure), a modern 
judge might view the legal status of moral principles as overdetermined—precedential (these 
days) as well as morally based. A classic Dworkinian observation can thus be seen in a new and 
potentially more favorable light: as evidence that the traditional conception of law as essentially 
tied to morality continues to impact contemporary legal practice. 
Admittedly, these final observations are speculative, and the use of conceptual genealogy 
to defend some legal theory (anti-positivist or otherwise) is not the point of this paper. Among 
 
 
 
125 Dworkin, “Model of Rules,” supra note 5 at 20-25. See discussion in §2. 
126 For further discussion, see text accompanying note 85 above. 
127 On semantic deference and its role in reference-fixing, see, e.g., Schroeter & Schroeter, supra note 2. 
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other things, an affirmative case would require a more comprehensive examination of the 
historical record—in particular, how widely jurists classified moral principles as ‘law’ on a 
priori grounds. An affirmative case would also involve weighing the virtues of competing 
accounts of how the legal concept might have changed over time, accounts that neither 
positivists nor anti-positivists have so far developed. And, ultimately, whether a theory of law is 
diachronically plausible is just one consideration among many to be weighed in evaluating 
competing theories. Nevertheless, we have made progress by demonstrating that (a) the history 
of juridical commentary on the laws of justice warrants greater and more systematic attention 
than the philosophy of law has traditionally paid it; (b) positivists struggle to explain this history 
without invoking a theory of conceptual change; and (c) regardless of which side of the Hart-
Dworkin debate one favors, a meta-semantics for legal terminology that accommodates 
conceptual change supplies reasons for revisiting central questions in this debate.  
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